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Abstract
This dissertation consists of two chapters that examine high managerial pay and
supply chain uncertainty.
Chapter 1 constructs a game-theoretic model in which high CEO pay emerges as
the outcome of an arms race, with each firm paying its CEO highly to protect its
competitive position against rivals who also pay highly. For an arms race to emerge,
highly-paid CEOs must generate idiosyncratic, privately-known internal effects on
profit, and CEO pay disparities must also generate asymmetric profit differences
from external effects beyond the simple differences in pay. If the distribution of
internal effects satisfies a key uniformity condition, an arms race emerges as the only
equilibrium of the game.
Chapter 2 examines the impact of supply chain uncertainty and ordering costs on
trade. Importers hold safety stock to hedge against delays in delivery. An increase in
supply chain uncertainty raises safety stocks, increases inventory costs, and reduces
imports from locations with high delivery time uncertainty. An increase in order
costs reduces a firm’s shipping frequency and increases average inventory holding
cost for the firm’s base inventory stock. As a result, firms import less from locations
with high ordering costs to reduce average inventory holding costs. Detailed data on
actual and expected arrival times of vessels at U.S. ports serve to measure supply chain
uncertainty consistent with the theory. Combined with detailed data on U.S. imports,
freight charges and unit values, a 10 percent increase in supply-chain uncertainty
lowers imports by as much as 3.7 percent. This is evidence that delivery uncertainty
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imposes a cost on imports according to the management of safety stocks. A one
percent increase in ordering costs lowers imports by as much as 1.2 percent. Ordering
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Over the past decade both journalists and academics have written about the level
of chief executive officer (CEO) pay both in the United States and in Europe. In
1989, the average CEO total compensation in the United States was $2.3 million,
increased to $8.4 million in 1999, and reached $11.4 million in 2009.1 At the same
time, average annual worker income in the United States rose from only $32,438
to $38,376.2 Recently, this type of earnings discrepancy has attracted the interest
of politicians, the media, and the general public, and is the driving force behind
movements such as Occupy Wall Street.3 Because of the large increase in CEO pay,
and because it is so high relative to the pay of ordinary workers, much of the recent
academic literature on executive compensation has sought to rationalize these trends.
The conventional approach to this issue entails investigating whether increased
CEO pay is matched by increased value to the firm. To this end, Finkelstein and Boyd
(1998) find that pay is positively correlated with managerial discretion, and Murphy
1Source: Forbes Annual Executive Compensation Reports. Data are in 2008 dollars.
2Source: United States Census Bureau. Data are in 2008 dollars.
3Occupy Wall Street is a movement that began on September 17, 2011 in Liberty Square in
Manhattan’s Financial District, and has spread to over 100 cities in the United States. Their goal is
“to expose how the richest 1% of people are writing the rules of an unfair global economy”. Source:
http://occupywallst.org/about/ (Accessed on November 07, 2011).
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and Zábojńık (2004, 2007) argue that increased CEO pay follows from increases in
the general (as opposed to specific) human capital required for the job. Rajgopal
et al. (2006) find that increased demand for talented CEOs, caused by market-wide
shocks, forces firms to set CEO pay high in order to retain their more talented
CEOs. Geletkanycz et al. (2001) go on to demonstrate that CEOs receive premiums
for strategically valuable external networks, and Westphal et al. (2006) document
that these networks include informal (friendship) networks with top executives of
both suppliers and financial institutions. Kroll et al. (1997); Schaefer (1998); and
Gabaix and Landier (2008) show that CEO compensation increases with the size of
the average firm in the economy. Most recently, Chang et al. (2010) test whether
firm performance and high pay reflect CEO ability or something else like other firm
assets, either physical or human, or simply luck. They reject their other explanations
in favor of high CEO pay reflecting high CEO ability.
An alternative approach looks for reasons why CEO pay might be higher than
would be consistent with the usual labor-market approach. Bebchuk et al. (2002)
consider the fact that CEOs have some ability to set their own pay, allowing them
to extract rents. Dow and Raposo (2005) explore the implications of CEO contracts
being different from typical principal-agent contracts because the former change over
time in accordance with firm’s performance and strategic direction. Aggarwal and
Samwick (1999) argue that CEO compensation is positively sensitive to rival firms’
performance. More recently, Malmendier and Tate (2009) find that firms pay award-
winning CEOs more, even though they do not perform better than their non-award-
winning matches, suggesting alternative benefits of having a highly paid “superstar”
CEO. Hayes and Schaefer (2009) find a “Lake Wobegon effect”, in which firms pay
their CEOs highly to signal that their chief executives are above average.4
We add to this second stream of literature by providing an additional reason for
high CEO pay - an arms race. Firms desire highly-paid CEOs because their rivals
4The Lake Wobegon effect is derived from Garrison Keillor’s radio program, A Prairie Home
Companion. The town of Lake Wobegon is described as a place where “all the women are strong,
all the men are good looking, and all the children are above average.”
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have highly-paid CEOs. In fact, in our model the only reason most firms hire highly-
paid CEOs is because they believe their rivals will, and only a small fraction of firms
would choose to hire highly-paid CEOs if they thought their rivals would hire low-
paid CEOs. Even so, this small fraction willing to hire highly-paid CEOs causes a
ripple effect that courses through the entire set of firms, with all firms choosing to
hire highly-paid CEOs in equilibrium.5
The arms race literature began during the 1960s motivated by the Cold War. The
first mathematical model of an arms race was formulated by Richardson (1960) using a
system of linear differential equations.6 More recent approaches use game theory, with
models of arms races between nations based on Cournot competition (Dumas, 1979;
Okuguchi, 1981) and on prisoner’s dilemma games (Brams, 1985; Brams and Kilgour,
1988). These arms race games have been applied to settings outside of actual weapons
build-up, including hospital technology investments (Foote, 1992; James, 2002), and
household vehicle size choices (White, 2004).
The most recent game-theoretic model of an arms race was developed by Baliga
and Sjöström (2004), and we rely heavily upon their framework to construct a model
of a CEO arms race. In their model each of two countries can choose to build new
weapons or not, and countries benefit from having more weapons than their rivals.
Nations differ in their costs of arming, with higher-cost nations preferring not to arm
when they believe that their rivals will not build new weapons, but lower-cost nations
having a dominant strategy of always building new weapons. No matter what the
cost, though, nations prefer to build more weapons when their rivals do. Baliga and
Sjöström establish that if nations believe that there is even a small probability of
facing a dominant strategy rival, a multiplier effect occurs and the unique Bayes-
Nash equilibrium involves an arms race with probability one. We build on Baliga and
5This result is in line with an important insight from Carlsson and Van Damme (1993). They
demonstrate that, under asymmetric information about the opponent’s preferences, a non-zero
probability that opponents will choose a particular action a∗ may cause every player to follow
suit.
6Refer to Anderton (1989) for a comprehensive discussion on Richardson-type arms race models
and applications.
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Sjöström’s model by making firms heterogeneous in the benefit, not cost, from arming.
We also generalize the model to the n firms case and demonstrate the conditions under
which an arms race occurs in this general scenario.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the conceptual framework
for understanding the CEO pay game. Section 3 utilizes a two-firm setting to
introduce the game firms play and identify the internal and external benefits of
hiring a highly-paid CEO. Section 4 generalizes the game to the n firms case and
also contains the main result, i.e. the conditions under which both the dominant-
strategy firms and the non-dominant-strategy firms hire highly-paid CEOs. Section
5 offers some conclusions.
1.2 Conceptual Framework
We construct a model in which each firm has rivals, and we abstract away from
whether this rivalry occurs in product, input, employment, or capital markets. Firms
choose what type of CEO to hire. They can hire a highly-paid (high-type) CEO or a
low-paid (low-type) CEO. A highly-paid CEO can benefit the firm in two ways, one
internal and one external.
The internal benefit is separate from the rivalry, and arises as the higher-paid CEO
runs the firm in a more efficient, more profitable way. This may occur, for example,
through improved positioning in capital markets, improved bargaining power with
suppliers or customers, increased social networks, or other factors that make the firm
more profitable. The internal benefit is therefore anything that the conventional CEO
pay literature describes as a reason for high CEO pay.7
The external benefit arises from a higher-paid CEO providing a competitive
advantage over rivals with a lower-paid CEO. This may occur, for example, because
the higher-paid CEO provides more credibility in capital markets, or signals higher
quality to customers. This benefit could arise, for example, from the superstar effect
7See the references cited in the second paragraph of the introduction.
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of Malmendier and Tate (2009) or the Lake Wobegon effect of Hayes and Schaefer
(2009). Firms with a lower-paid CEO facing rivals with a higher-paid CEO observe
negative external effect. This can result from low pay being a signal of low firm value
or low managerial quality (Hayes and Schaefer, 2009) which makes investors prefer
high-paying firms over their low-paying rivals.
We assume that the external effect is identical and commonly known, but that
the internal effect is private information. The nature of the game has every firm
preferring a highly-paid CEO when their rivals have highly-paid CEOs, but this may
or may not be a dominant strategy. When the internal effect is large enough that the
benefit the highly-paid CEO provides exceeds the wage difference, having a highly-
paid CEO dominates. On the other hand, when the internal effect is smaller than
the wage difference, firms would prefer a low-paid CEO when their rivals also have
low-paid CEOs.
We show that if there are some firms with a large enough internal effect to make
hiring a highly-paid CEO a dominant strategy, and a sufficiently uniform distribution
of internal effects across firms, an arms race ensues and every firm chooses a highly-
paid CEO. The reasoning is as follows, and matches the contagion story of Baliga
and Sjöström (2004). When the internal effect is sufficiently large to make hiring
a highly-paid CEO a dominant strategy, the firm chooses a highly-paid CEO. Now
consider a firm whose internal effect is just slightly lower than this. The firm will
prefer to hire a low-paid CEO in response to its rivals hiring a low-paid CEO, while
hiring a highly-paid CEO is still a best response to other firms’ high hiring because
of the external rivalry effect. This firm does not possess a dominant strategy, but we
can think of such a firm as an “almost-dominant strategy” firm because its internal
effect is almost as large as that of a dominant strategy firm.
For these “almost-dominant strategy” firms, hiring a highly-paid CEO is still a
best response to hiring a highly-paid CEO, but hiring a low-paid CEO is a best
response to hiring a low-paid CEO. Choosing to hire a highly-paid CEO, though,
entails only a small loss if the rival hires a low-paid CEO, whereas choosing to hire a
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low-paid CEO results in large losses when the rival hires a highly-paid CEO. When
there is a sufficiently positive (but still small) probability that other firms have highly-
paid CEOs, the “almost dominant” firm will choose to hire a highly-paid CEO to avoid
the large losses. Thus, the firm becomes infected and mimics the dominant strategy
firms. The same reasoning then applies to firms with the next lowest internal benefits,
and such contagion could eventually affect all firms. In this case, an arms race occurs.
Based on these arguments, the arms-race approach to CEO pay leads to a new
understanding of why CEO pay is so high. It only takes a few firms hiring highly-paid
CEOs to make everyone hire highly-paid CEOs, because these few firms are enough
to start an “epidemic” of high hiring. Importantly, though, this prevalence of highly-
paid CEO arises from equilibrium behavior, and no firm can gain from unilaterally
lowering pay. Consequently, a typical firm’s correct rationale for hiring a highly-paid
CEO amounts to “because everyone else does.”
1.3 The CEO Hiring Game
Two firms compete in some relevant market, either a product market, capital market,
or labor market. Both firms maximize profit, and to do so choose what type of CEO
to hire. Firms can draw CEOs from a market of high-type CEOs or from a market
of low-type CEOs. We assume that firms pay competitive wages in both markets,
however, high-type CEOs demand a wage premium (i.e. high market clearing wage)
while low-type CEOs are paid standard wages (i.e. low market clearing wage). The
premium (or wage differential) is fixed at w > 0. For the baseline case in which both
firms choose to hire low-paid CEOs, we normalize profit to be 0.
Hiring a highly-paid CEO does two things. First, it adds a firm-specific net
increment xi ∈ [x, x̄] to the firm’s profit.8 This increment is private information to
the firm and drawn independently from the distribution F (x). This is the internal
effect. We require x̄ > 0, but x may be positive or negative. Second, the highly-paid
8One can interpret xi as firm i’s net benefit above a firm-specific hiring cost.
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CEO provides the firm with a competitive advantage if its rival chooses a low-paid
CEO, with the highly-paid CEO firm earning an extra B > 0 in gross profit and the
low-paid CEO firm losing N > 0. This is the external effect. It is assumed to be
identical across firms, which is consistent with the notion that the impact of having a
higher-paid CEO than one’s rival is determined by the nature of the market pairing
rather than the characteristics of the individual firm. The resulting payoffs generate





Highly-Paid (H) xi − w, xj − w xi +B − w,−N
Low-Paid (L) −N, xj +B − w 0, 0
To understand the game, consider first a situation in which both xi and xj are
zero. If firm j hires a highly-paid CEO, firm i’s choice is between hiring a highly-paid
CEO and earnings of −w, or a low-paid CEO and earnings of −N . If w < N hiring
a highly-paid CEO is a best response to hiring a highly-paid CEO. On the other
hand, if firm j hires a low-paid CEO, firm i faces a choice between a highly-paid
CEO and earnings of B − w, or a low-paid CEO and earnings of 0. If B < w hiring
a low-paid CEO is a best response to hiring a low-paid CEO. Consequently, when
B < w < N there are two pure strategy equilibria in the special case where it is
known that xi = xj = 0, and in these two pure strategy equilibria both firms hire the
same type of CEO.
Now suppose instead that firm i’s internal profitability increment xi satisfies xi +
B > w. Hiring a highly-paid CEO remains a best response to hiring a highly-paid
CEO, but firm i’s best response to firm j hiring a low-paid CEO is for firm i to hire
a highly-paid CEO, because the combination of the productivity increment and the
competitive advantage more than offset the extra CEO pay. Consequently, hiring
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a highly-paid CEO is a dominant strategy when the firm’s private increment xi is
sufficiently high.
We restrict the components of the game so that:
w < N + x (1.1)
x+B < w < x̄+B (1.2)
Condition (1.1) states that for firms with the smallest internal effect, hiring a highly-
paid CEO is a best response to the rival hiring a highly-paid CEO. Higher values of
the internal effect xi only enhance this incentive, so highly-paid being a best response
to highly-paid holds for all values of xi ∈ [x, x̄]. The first inequality in condition
(1.2 ) states that for the firm with the lowest internal effect hiring a low-paid CEO
is a best response to hiring a low-paid CEO, while the second inequality, coupled
with condition (1.1 ), says that for the firm with the highest internal effect hiring a
highly-paid CEO is a dominant strategy.
These two inequalities imply that B < N , that is, the benefit to the winner of
the CEO-hiring competition is smaller than the loss to the loser. Such a condition is
consistent with findings in the literature. According to Hayes and Schaefer (2009),
CEO pay serves as a signal of managerial quality and firm value to stock market
participants. The different magnitudes might reflect that positive signals attract less
capital than negative signals deter. It might also reflect the countervailing effect
caused by institutional investors moving away from firms with higher-paid CEOs, as
documented by David et al. (1998) and Hartzell and Starks (2003).
Conditions (1.1) and (1.2) imply that for low values of x both types of hiring are
rationalizable but for high values of x hiring a highly-paid CEO becomes a dominant
strategy. If there is a positive probability of some players being dominant strategy
firms, a contagion effect comes into play, and can lead to a CEO arms race, with all
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firms hiring highly-paid CEOs even though for most of them it is not a dominant
strategy.
To see how this contagion comes about, consider firm i’s decision of whether to
hire a highly-paid CEO or a low-paid CEO. Firm i knows that if i finds it beneficial
to hire a highly-paid CEO, any firm with a larger internal effect than xi will also find
it beneficial. Consequently, firm i realizes that if it chooses a highly-paid CEO, the
probability that it faces a rival with a highly-paid CEO is at least 1 − F (xi). If the
firm faces a high-hiring rival, hiring high itself generates a gain of xi−w+N compared
to hiring low. If, instead, the firm faces a low-hiring rival, hiring high generates a
gain of xi − w +B. Because the probability of facing a high-hiring rival, conditional
on i choosing to hire a highly-paid CEO itself, is at least 1−F (xi), the expected gain
from hiring a highly-paid CEO satisfies
E(H)− E(L) ≥ [1− F (xi)] (xi − w +N) + F (xi)(xi − w +B),
where E(H) is the expected payoff from hiring a highly-paid CEO (i.e. the expected
payoff from action H) and E(L) is the expected payoff from hiring a low-paid CEO
(i.e. the expected payoff from action L). The inequality holds because N > B by
conditions (1) and (2). Firm i chooses to hire the highly-paid CEO if E(H)−E(L) ≥
0, which can be rearranged to
1− F (xi) ≥
w − xi −B
N −B
. (1.3)
According to this expression, firm i chooses to hire a highly-paid CEO when there
are “enough” firms with higher internal effects than it has. Essentially, firm i hires
the high-type CEO to defend itself against all the other firms hiring high-types. If
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expression (1.3) holds for every value of x in [x, x̄] then every firm hires highly-paid
CEOs, and the arms race ensues.
Note that N > B by conditions (1) and (2), and that w−x < N for all x ∈ [x, x̄] by
condition (1), so that the right-hand side of (3) lies between 0 and 1. Also, condition
(2) implies the existence of a value x̂ ∈ [x, x̄] such that w − x̂ = B. Because the
right-hand side of (3) is decreasing in x and equal to 0 when x = x̂, condition (3)
is automatically satisfied for firm with internal values in [x̂, x̄] but not for those in
[x, x̂).
1.4 The CEO Arms Race
We begin this section by extending the above analysis to the case of more than two
firms. To that end, suppose that n ≥ 2 profit-maximizing firms compete in the
relevant market. Since it is a static game, the number of firms is fixed. Each firm
chooses between hiring either a high-type (highly-paid) CEO or a low-type (low-paid)
CEO, with the wage premium w > 0 fixed across firms. If every firm chooses to hire
the low-type CEO, profits are normalized to be 0.
Consider firm i and suppose that hi of the other n − 1 firms hire high-types
and n − hi − 1 hire low-types. When firm i hires a low-type, it will lose the CEO-
hiring competition and have a payoff of −r(hi)N , where r(hi) is a function that
determines firm i’s share of the total loss N . When firm i hires a high-type, its payoff
is xi + s(n− hi − 1)B − w, where s(n− hi − 1) determines i’s share of total benefit.
Formally, the function r : [0, n − 1] → [0, 1] is a loss-sharing rule if it is
nondecreasing and onto. In particular, this requires r(0) = 0 so that a firm does not
experience any external loss if it plays L when all other firms do, and r(n− 1) = 1 so
that a firm suffers the entire external loss if it is the only firm to play L when everyone
10
else plays H. Similarly, the function s : [0, n − 1] → [0, 1] is a benefit-sharing rule
if it is nonincreasing and onto. This requires that s(n − 1) = 0 so that a firm gains
no external benefit when it plays H and so do all other firms, and it requires that
s(0) = 1 so that a firm gains the entire external benefit by being the only firm to hire
the highly-paid CEO. Requiring that r be a loss-sharing rule and s a benefit-sharing
rule allows for unique identification of the external loss and benefit parameters N and
B from the cases where one firm acts differently from all of the others. Furthermore,
other than the requirement that the functions be strictly monotone, the rules say
nothing about whether total external losses and benefits increase or decrease as the
number of firms hiring high-types changes.









These functions have intuitive appeal. Firm i’s payoff would be −Nhi/(n− 1) in
the low-type case, and xi + B(n − hi − 1)/(n − 1) − w in the high-type case. Using
these functions, if firm i is the only one to hire a low-type, then hi = n − 1 and its
payoff is −N just as in the two-firm case. As fewer firms choose to hire a high-type
CEO, though, i’s external loss is scaled back proportionally so that if only one firm
chooses to hire a high-type, i’s payoff is −N/(n − 1). Similarly, if i is the only firm
to hire a high-type its profit is xi +B−w, as in the two-firm case, but as more firms
hire a high-type the external benefit is scaled back. If all firms hire the same type
of CEO the external effect is zero and profit is either xi − w when every firm hires a
high-type, or 0 when every firm hires a low-type.
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As before, assume that firms draw the internal effect xi independently from F (x)
with support [x, x̄]. Conditions (1.1) and (1.2) now have different interpretations.
With more than two firms, condition (1.1) states that the negative external effect is
large enough to make a firm with the smallest internal effect hire a high-type when
all other firms hire a high-type. The first inequality in condition (1.2) states that for
the firm with the lowest internal effect hiring a low-type is a best response to hiring a
low-type, even if no other firm hires a highly-paid CEO. The second inequality makes
the firm with the highest internal effect hire a highly-paid CEO even when it is the
only one to do so.
Proposition 1.1. Suppose that conditions (1.1) and (1.2) hold. Then for any
pair of loss- and benefit-sharing rules there exists a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which
every firm chooses to hire a highly-paid CEO, but there does not exist a Bayes-Nash
equilibrium in which all firms choose to hire a low-paid CEO.
Proof. To show that there exists a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which every firm plays
H, note that that if everyone else plays H then the lowest internal effect firm x prefers
H to L if and only if
x− w ≥ −r(n− 1)N = −N, (1.6)
where the last equality comes from the requirement that r be a loss-sharing rule.
Condition (1.1) then guarantees that the lowest internal effect firm playsH in response
to the other n− 1 firms playing H. However, if (1.6) holds for the firm with x, it also
holds for any other firm with x > x. Thus, H is a best response to H for all firms
and so there exists a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which all firms play H.
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To show that there is no Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which all firms play L, note
that if h = 0 a firm with internal effect x plays H if and only if
0 ≤ x+ s(0)B − w = x+B − w. (1.7)
Condition (1.2) guarantees that a strict version of the inequality (1.7) holds for x = x̄,
and firms with internal effect in the interval [w − B, x̄] play H even when no other
firms do. Therefore any Bayes-Nash equilibrium must have at least some firms playing
H, and consequently cannot have every firm playing L.
The above proposition establishes that equilibria of the game exist, and begins
to narrow down the types of behavior that can occur in equilibrium. The next
proposition characterizes equilibrium behavior further.
Proposition 1.2. Suppose that conditions (1) and (2) hold. Then for any pair
of loss- and benefit-sharing rules, in every Bayes-Nash equilibrium there exists an
x∗ ∈ [x, x̄) such that every firm with internal effect in the interval [x∗, x̄] chooses
to hire a highly-paid CEO and every firm with internal effect in the interval [x, x∗)
chooses to hire a low-paid CEO.
Proof. In a Bayes-Nash equilibrium, strategies must respond optimally with their
beliefs. Beliefs, in turn, must be consistent with equilibrium strategies. For each
firm with internal effect x, then, Bayes-Nash equilibrium specifies an action from
{H,L} and a belief h̃ about the random variable governing the number of firms
playing H. Because internal effects are drawn independently, no firm’s x provides any
information about the posterior distribution of drawn internal effects. Consequently,
h̃ is independent of x.
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To prove the assertion suppose, to the contrary, that there exist two firms such
that firm 1 with internal effect x1 plays H and firm 2 with internal effect x2 > x1
plays L. Given the common beliefs h̃, firm 1 plays H if and only if
E
[













s(n− h̃− 1)B − w
]
. (1.8)
Note that the right-hand side of (1.8) is independent of type. Consequently,






s(n− h̃− 1)B − w
]
and firm 2 strictly prefers to play H. This provides a contradiction, thereby
establishing the assertion.
The above result shows that in every equilibrium the firms hiring high-type CEOs
are those with large internal effects, and that firms hiring low-type CEOs have smaller
internal effects. This is intuitively plausible. It also states that in every equilibrium
there is at least a partial arms race, as the firms with the largest internal effects choose
to hire highly-paid CEOs and those with slightly smaller internal effects choose to
hire highly-paid CEOs in defense. The next proposition establishes circumstances
under which an arms race must impact the entire population. It also establishes
that, under those circumstances, a CEO arms race must occur because it is the only
Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
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Proposition 1.3. If conditions (1.1) and (1.2) hold, if r(h̃) = h̃/(n− 1) and s(h̃) =
(n− h̃− 1)/(n− 1), and if
F (x) <
N − (w − x)
N −B
(1.9)
for all x ∈ [x, x̄], then the Bayes-Nash equilibrium is unique and all firms choose to
hire a highly-paid CEO.
Proof. We first show that using proportional scaling functions (1.4) and (1.5)
condition (1.8) under which firm i chooses to play H reduces to a simpler expression.
Notice that E[h̃] = (n− 1)(1− F (x∗)). Then:
E[−r(h̃)] = −(n− 1)(1− F (x
∗))
n− 1
= F (x∗)− 1




Inequality (1.8) for any firm i becomes:
xi ≥ (F (x∗)− 1)N − F (x∗)B + w. (1.10)
Rearranging we get:
F (x∗) ≤ N − (w − xi)
N −B
.
For this special case of proportional scaling functions we show that if the
distribution of internal effects satisfies (1.9) there is no equilibrium in which L is
played with positive probability. Suppose not, so that firm i plays L with positive
probability. Because H is a best response to H, for i to play L with positive
probability i must place positive probability on some of its rivals also playing L.
Because the xis are drawn independently and players must follow a cutoff strategy,
there exists an interval [x, ξi) such that i believes that rivals who draw values x ∈ [x, ξi)
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play L and those who draw x ∈ [ξi, x̄] play H. Furthermore, there exists an interval
[x, x∗i ) such that player i plays L if and only if xi ∈ [x, x∗i ). Then for player i
x∗i = w −N + F (ξi)(N −B).
Suppose that x∗i ≥ ξi. Then
x∗i = w −N + F (ξi)(N −B) ≤ w −N + F (x∗i )(N −B)
which implies that
F (x∗i ) ≥
N − (w − x∗i )
N −B
and violates condition (1.9). Consequently, it must be the case that x∗i < ξi for
firm i to play L with positive probability. This same condition must hold for every
player, which means that every player believes that its rivals use a higher cutoff
point than they do. Such beliefs cannot be consistent with Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
This establishes a contradiction to the hypothesis that firms play L with positive
probability. Thus, when (1.9) holds there is a unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium and
every firm chooses H.
The three propositions establish conditions under which an arms race for CEO
hiring occurs, and under which it is the only equilibrium. In particular, the uniqueness
result of Proposition 1.3 establishes conditions under which firms cannot avoid a
CEO arms race. To help understand their meaning, it is beneficial to see how the
different assumptions impact the outcome. The first assumption was the existence of
idiosyncratic internal effects, captured by xi. Suppose instead that xi is fixed at x for
all i, with the added assumption that x > w−N , consistent with condition (1.1). This
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condition implies that H is a best response to H, which we had assumed to hold for all
types. Two possibilities emerge. If x ≥ w−B, then H is a (weak) best response to L,
so that H is a (weakly) dominant strategy. No arms race explanation is required here,
though, because high-type CEO hiring arises entirely from the internal effect, that is,
highly-paid CEOs add enough to the firm’s profit to justify the high wage regardless of
what rivals do. The second case has x < w−B, in which case L is a best response to L.
The game has two pure strategy equilibria, in which case high-type CEO hiring occurs
not because of an arms race but simply as a result of the solution to a coordination
problem. Idiosyncratic internal effects prove necessary for the explanation of high-
type CEO hiring to come from an arms race. Furthermore, firms must face the
possibility that some of their rivals have a sufficiently large internal effect to make
hiring a highly-paid CEO a dominant strategy. In this case, if idiosyncratic internal
effects are distributed according to condition (1.9), even the small possibility of facing
a dominant-strategy opponent will cause contagion. The small group of dominant-
strategy players will induce the rest of the firms to hire highly-paid CEOs.
The second assumption was that the external effect consisted of a larger loss from
having the lower-paid CEO than the gain from having the higher-paid CEO, that is,
N > B.9 If this fails, condition (1.9) would require that F (x) be negative, which is
impossible. As Proposition 1.3 proves, when condition (1.9) fails no arms race occurs.
Consequently, asymmetric impacts of CEO type differences, with losers losing more
than winners gain, prove crucial for the existence of an arms race in CEO hiring.
We introduce the loss- (benefit-) sharing rule functions that only need to be
nondecreasing (nonincreasing) and onto for Propositions 2 and 1.2 to hold. For
Proposition 1.3 we reduce the set of possible functions to linear form in order to
9This second assumption precludes the possibility of no external effect. Without the external
effect there is no reason for firms to care what type of CEO their rivals hire, and the denominator
of condition (1.9) is zero. Obviously, some sort of external effect is vital.
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be able to calculate their expectations more easily. However, the inequality (1.10)
holds for a more general set of concave functions.10 Concavity means that losses
(benefits) of firms that pay low wage (high wage) exceed losses (benefits) that are
generated by linear proportional scaling functions.
Finally, Proposition 1.3 links a CEO arms race to condition (1.9), about which
more must be said. The left-hand side, F (x), measures the fraction of firms that have
internal effects no larger than x, while the right-hand side is an increasing function
of x, and both functions are depicted in Figure 1. The key to the condition is the
right-hand-side function (N − (w − x))/(N −B). This function takes the value zero
when w − x = N . Condition (1.1) states that w − x < N for all x ∈ [x, x̄], and
so the function (N − (w − x))/(N − B) crosses the horizontal axis to the left of
x. The function takes the value 1 when w − x = B, and by (1.2) this occurs for
some value of x between x and x̄, as shown. Thus, the “support” of the function
(N − (w − x))/(N − B) is shifted to the left of the support of F (x). As the figure
shows, condition (1.9) is satisfied as long as F (x) does not place too much weight in
its left tail, and the figure is drawn for a bell-shaped density. Furthermore, in the
special case in which x is uniformly distributed, so that F (x) is linear, condition (1.9)
is automatically satisfied. Consequently, one can interpret condition (1.9) as saying
that the distribution of the internal effect must be “close” to uniform without too
much weight, or too large of a spike, in its lower tail. Any distribution that shifts
mass rightward from the uniform distribution will automatically satisfy the condition
as well. As Proposition 1.3 proves, such distributions of internal effect lead to a CEO
arms race.
10By Jensen’s inequality, xi + s(n − E[h̃] − 1)B − w ≥ E
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This paper identifies circumstances under which firms might engage in an arms race
to have higher paid CEOs. Such an arms race requires both an internal effect and
an external effect from hiring a highly-paid CEO. The internal effect arises when
marginal improvements in own CEO type (or quality) generate marginal increases in
own profit, holding rival CEO type constant. The external effect provides a profit
boost to firms with higher-paid CEOs and a loss to those with lower-paid CEOs.
Arms races occur when the following circumstances hold: (i) the magnitude of the
internal effect is heterogeneous, private information, and sufficiently uniform, (ii)
there is positive probability that some firms have large enough internal effects that
they find it worthwhile to hire high-type (highly-paid) CEOs regardless of what their
rivals do, and (iii) the external effect is homogeneous and causes firms to lose more
from having the lower-paid CEO than they would gain from having the higher-paid
CEO.
For CEOs, the internal effect arises as a higher-paid CEO runs the firm in a
more efficient, more profitable way, perhaps because of improved access to capital
markets or increased bargaining power with suppliers or labor. The external effect
occurs because a higher-paid CEO provides a competitive advantage over a rival with
a lower-paid CEO, perhaps because of signaling to customers. Under appropriate
distributional assumptions, these two effects can lead to an arms race for CEO pay.
The arms race itself arises out of a kind of contagion, albeit one that occurs instantly
rather than through time. The firms with the highest internal effects have an incentive
to hire highly-paid CEOs, which provides the firms with the next highest internal
effects with an incentive to also hire a highly-paid CEO, and so on, until every firm
hires a highly-paid CEO.
19
One implication of the model is that firms hire highly-paid CEOs regardless of
their internal effects. Instead, these CEOs are hired not because of what they can
do for the firm, but what their type, in and of itself, does for the firm. Essentially,
the firm needs a highly-paid CEO to protect its competitive position. This may shed
light on one particularly prominent instance of high CEO pay. In 2001 the legendary
Jack Welch retired from his CEO position at General Electric. GE chose his successor
from among three well-qualified, internal candidates: Jeffrey Immelt, Jim McNerney,
and Robert Nardelli. GE promoted Immelt to CEO, while McNerney left to become
CEO of 3M and Nardelli left to become CEO of Home Depot. GE and 3M have many
similarities, using technological innovation to develop new products in many diverse
markets, so one can imagine why McNerney would generate a large, positive internal
effect at 3M. It is much harder for one to see how the skills from running GE Power
Systems would translate into strong internal effects in the world of big-box retailing
at Home Depot. The arms race model predicts that Nardelli’s pay would be high
anyway, and it was.
The increased relevance of external effects may be one of the drivers why CEO
pay increased so dramatically over the last twenty years. An event that possibly
made external effects more relevant was the adoption of amendments to the executive
compensation disclosure approach by the Securities and Exchange Commission
in 1992. The amendments required highly formatted disclosure to facilitate the
comparison of annual compensation among companies. Examples of external effects
given earlier in the paper included higher-paid CEOs having more credibility in capital
markets or signaling higher quality to customers. For these channels to operate
outsiders must be able to verify the CEO’s pay, and the new disclosure requirements
allow this channel to open.
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An identical setting, with identical results, could be applied to markets other than
that for CEOs. Perhaps the most obvious is the market for mutual fund managers.
A highly-paid mutual fund manager might be able to generate higher return on the
portfolio, which is the internal effect. At the same time, a highly-paid manager might
attract customers away from a rival, whereas a fund with a low-paid manager might
lose investors not just to a single rival but to the industry as a whole. This creates
an asymmetry for the external effect, with the losses from having a low-paid manager
outpacing the gains from having a highly-paid one. Given these circumstances, one
might expect to see an arms race for mutual fund managers.
The arms race analysis cannot, however, explain high salaries in professional
sports, or for that matter high salaries for collegiate coaches. Hiring marquee athletes
or coaches may generate an external effect as the fan base and team revenue may
respond to the league’s distribution of superstars. At the same time, individual
athletes or coaches certainly have an internal effect, but one would be hard pressed to
argue that these internal effects are private information given the very public nature
of the profession. Consequently, player salaries are unlikely to be driven by an arms
race.
Comparing these settings leads to an empirical approach. The paper’s main
proposition states that when the conditions for an arms race arise, the only outcome is
an arms race. An appropriate empirical strategy, then, concentrates on the conditions
for an arms race rather than an arms race itself, identifying both internal and external
benefits of hiring highly-paid CEOs.
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Figure 1.1: The Theorem Illustrated
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Chapter 2
Supply Chain Uncertainty as a
Trade Barrier
2.1 Introduction
Goods traded over long distances are subject to unexpected delays in delivery. At
U.S. ports over forty percent of vessels arrive one or more days late. In 2007 the
average vessel arriving from China at U.S. ports was 3 days late and the average
vessel from Europe missed the arrival date by 2.7 days. Vessels also often arrive
early, requiring storage until the date of delivery to a customer or absorption in a
production process. This matters for importers that rely on timely delivery, because
late arrivals may result in lost demand and early arrivals increase storage costs.
This paper identifies the impact of supply chain uncertainty and inventory
management on international trade. The theory examines how inventory management
impacts import demand if importers hedge against bad arrival shocks by holding
safety stock. The empirics identify the impact of supply chain uncertainty on import
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demand and quantify the inventory management costs associated with managing
supply side risk.
The theory employs a stochastic inventory model from the logistics and economics
literature (Song et al. (2009), Wisner et al. (2005), Eppen and Martin (1988), Baumol
and Vinod (1970)) to derive two testable hypotheses. First, to avoid disruptions due
to unexpected delays in delivery, importers respond to an increase in delivery time
uncertainty with an increase in their safety stock. This increase raises inventory
holding costs and reduces import demand relative to locations with a lower degree of
supply chain uncertainty. Second, to minimize base-stock inventory costs, an importer
trades off a higher order frequency at a fixed ordering cost for lower average inventory
holding costs. As a consequence, an importer responds to an increase in order costs
with a reduction in shipping frequency which implies an increase in average inventory
holding costs. The importer responds to this increase in average inventory holding
costs by reducing demand from locations with high ordering costs relative to other
locations subject to lower ordering costs.
To test these two predictions we combine several sources of information. To
measure supply chain uncertainty across source countries for U.S. imports and
districts of entry we employ expected vessel arrival dates filed by shippers and actual
arrival dates at U.S. ports for 2007-2009 from Import Genius1. We obtain ordering
costs from Doing Business and import, freight charge and unit value data from the
U.S. Census Imports of Merchandise. With these data sources at hand, we construct
a panel data set of imports that arrive in the U.S. via ocean vessel reported by district
of unloading, source country, year of entry and HS 10 product. This rich source of
variation allows us to account for several variables that are suggested by the theory,
but are not directly observable. Exploiting variation across source countries of imports
1importgenius.com
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within district-by-product pairs the results imply that a 10 percent increase in supply
chain uncertainty lowers trade by up to 4.2 percent. A one percent increase in the
ordering costs lowers imports by as much as 1.2 percent. This is evidence that supply
chain uncertainty and ordering costs impact the intensive margin of trade consistent
with the inventory process from the theory.
A back of the envelope structural model shows that a one standard deviation
increase in supply chain uncertainty from the mean raises inventory holding costs by
$627,694 per year if the total shipping quantity is unchanged. This cost is based on
an estimated daily per unit inventory cost of about $0.72. In other words, supply
chain uncertainty raises the costs of importing and is therefore a friction to trade.
Identifying sources of trade costs that are otherwise difficult to observe is an
ongoing area of research. Hummels and Schaur (2012) quantify the impact of transit
time as a trade barrier. Djankov et al. (2010) identify the impact of time delays
within countries on trade and Carballo et al. (2012) examine the impact of trade and
customs delay on firm level imports and exports. Harrigan and Venables (2006) show
that timeliness imposes trade costs that are qualitatively different from monetary
costs because of demand or supply uncertainty. Blonigen and Wilson (2008) identify
the impact of port efficiency on trade. While all of these articles have examined some
aspect of the supply chain in determining trade flows, to our knowledge we are the
first to identify supply chain uncertainty as a trade barrier.
In our empirical application we account for several other mechanisms that firms
may use to mitigate the impact of uncertainty. However, contrary to the existing
literature, we consider how these mechanisms may mitigate supply side as opposed
to demand side shocks. Hummels and Schaur (2010) show that firms subject to
demand uncertainty speed up their supply chain by substituting into expensive air
transport. Also with demand uncertainty in mind, Evans and Harrigan (2005) provide
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evidence that firms move closer to the destination market to speed up delivery. We
provide evidence that inventories are an alternative means to manage uncertainty.
Nevertheless, we also provide evidence that air transport as well as sourcing from
close by markets such as Canada and Mexico are relevant strategies to manage supply
chain uncertainty.
Alessandria et al. (2010) examine how firms use inventories to respond to demand
uncertainty. In their calibration exercise they find that the volatility necessary to
explain the large inventory holdings found in the data is about 5 times bigger than the
real data-based demand volatility found in Khan and Thomas (2007) and therefore
must include other sources of uncertainty not specified in the model. We provide
evidence that supply side shocks in the form of unexpected delays in delivery are an
additional source that contributes to a firm’s inventory. Alessandria et al. (2010) build
a dynamic model that examines a firm’s optimal inventory and pricing behavior. We
abstract from optimal price adjustments when firms run out of inventory. The logistics
literature suggests that firms hold safety stock such that they satisfy between 95-99
percent of demand.2 While Alessandria et al. (2010) show that price adjustments are
important, we use this fact to assume that firms hold enough safety stock to satisfy
all of their demand. Therefore, our theory focuses on the year to year problems and
costs imposed by inventory management as opposed to the extreme event when firms
run out of safety stock.
This paper is also related to literature on trade in intermediate inputs. This type
of trade is growing and comprises 40 to 60 percent of total international trade in the
modern world (Ramanarayanan (2006)). About one-third of all international trade
is intra-firm trade and for the U.S. this number is about 46%, as shown by Antràs
(2003). Recent research derives intermediate input demand from a CES production
2For example, see Dullaert et al. (2007) and Fortuin (1980)
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functions that exhibits love of variety; firms import all available varieties to lower their
production costs (e.g. Kasahara and Lapham (2012) or Amiti and Davis (2012)). We
also derive our import demand from a CES production function and we allow for
heterogeneity in productivity of importing firms. However, assuming homogeneity in
productivity the import demand is akin to the import demand in a standard Melitz
(2003) type model. Therefore, our model can be easily interpreted in terms of final
goods or intermediate inputs.
Section 2.2 derives the import demand as a function of supply chain uncertainty
and ordering costs to derive the main predictions for the empirics. Section 2.3
derives the empirical specifications, details the data construction and identification
approach to discuss results and robustness checks. Section 2.4 finishes with some
broad conclusions and ideas for future research.
2.2 Theory
This section derives a firm’s import demand taking into account that the importer
holds inventory to smooth supply chain uncertainty. An increase in the uncertainty
of the arrival time of ordered products requires firms to hold a larger amount of safety
stock to hedge against bad arrival shocks. As a result, an increase in supply chain
uncertainty increases inventory costs and lowers the import demand.
2.2.1 Import Demand
Consider an importer indexed by i who sells a final bundle of goods Qit on the home
market. To produce the final good the importer orders products qijt from international
markets indexed by j ∈ J , where J is an exogenous set of source countries3 and
3Similar to the existing literature we do not solve for the endogenous number of source countries.
For example, Amiti and Davis (2012) assume that firms import inputs from all available markets,
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ρ , where mijt is a constant marginal cost of importing and
















Without the productivity parameter ϕi this import demand is similar to Melitz (2003).
Therefore, we can interpret qijt as the demand for the variety i from the aggregate
consumption bundle Qit demanded by the representative consumer in any period t.
We now derive the constant import cost mijt as a function of factory gate prices,
transit costs and inventory costs.
2.2.2 Importer’s Costs
The importer holds inventory to serve gradually arriving demand on the home market.
Assume that there is no uncertainty in the arrival of ordered products. In that case the
firm trades off ordering costs with inventory holding costs to determine the optimal
amount of inventory and the cost minimizing number of shipments within a planning
period t. Figure (2.1) shows an importer who orders half of his yearly imports in the
beginning of the year and uses it up gradually until the next shipment arrives. More
frequent shipping lowers the average amount stored in inventory, but comes with
additional ordering costs. Let ordering costs rjt represent all the expenses associated
due to the CES production function’s love of variety. For the empirics this assumption is innocuous,
as we absorb the aggregate variable with fixed effects.
4Finally, 0 < ρ < 1 is a parameter that determines the elasticity of substitution between imported
goods θ = 1/(1− ρ) > 1.
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with ordering a shipment from country j. Total ordering costs per year are then
rjtnijt, where nijt is the total number of orders the firm places during the planning
period t. Let w denote the unit annual inventory cost. Because the withdrawal from













Now suppose that the firm holds safety stock to hedge against delays in the arrival
time of ordered products.5 Let lsjt denote the lead time, the time that passes between
ordering and receiving a shipment s in a year t. Let vijt denote the daily inventory
a firm withdraws to supply the home market. If the firm does not hold safety stock,
then it will stock out (run out of inventory), if lsjt > l̄jt, where l̄jt is the expected
delivery time. The logistics literature suggests that firms hold safety stock to keep
the probability of stocking out between 1-5 percent.6 How much safety stock must a
firm hold to stock out with a probability of 1 percent? Let l99jt be a threshold such
that lsjt > l
99
jt with a probability of one percent, P (lsjt > l
99
jt ) = 0.01. Then, if the firm
can cover the potential wait time l99jt − l̄jt at a withdrawal rate of vijt, the firm stocks
out with a probability of 1 percent. To guarantee a 1 percent stock-out probability,
safety stock must then be (safety stock)1% = (l99jt − l̄jt)vijt. The logistics literature
shows that (l99jt − l̄jt)vijt = kσijtvijt, for a normal distribution of the lead time in days
with a standard deviation σijt. The exogenously given parameter k is called a service
factor such that for a 1 percent probability of stocking out k is the 99th percentile of
the standard normal distribution. For daily withdrawal rates vijt = qijt/365 the total
expected costs of base and safety stocks are then the standard expected inventory
5We assume that varieties imported from different locations are not substitutable in the short
run and therefore firms hold buffer stock. Even though goods are substitutable according to the
elasticity of substitution framework over longer planning periods, we assume that it is too costly to
substitute varieties imported from, say, Germany with varieties from Russia in the short run.
6See Dullaert et al. (2007) and Fortuin (1980)
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The expected amount of inventory is calculated as the average amount of base
stock over the year plus the safety stock. This is an approximation, because in case
of a late shipment the firm will use safety stock to satisfy demand, so the amount of
safety stock will decrease. In case of an early shipment the safety stock will increase.
With the assumption that the lead time is distributed normally, the average amount
of safety stock over the year is equal to k
365
σijtqijt. Johnson and Montgomery (1974)
show that this approximation is good if the stock-out time is small relative to the
cycle length. When a shipment is extremely late the firm stocks out completely and
does not have any imports in its inventory. However, if the firm chooses its service
factor k to be large, it only stocks out with a small probability. Additional discussion
of this issue can be found in Appendix A.
Inventory cost function (2.2) reflects the key issues of inventory management.
First, for a given stock-out probability and annual quantity qijt, an increase in the
lead time uncertainty raises inventory holding costs due to an increase in the safety
stock. Second, an increase in the number of shipments raises ordering costs but lowers
average inventory holding costs, reflecting a trade-off between ordering costs and the
base stock. To obtain the optimal shipping frequency as a function of qijt, minimize




. Substitute the number of







7For examples in the logistics literature see: Baumol and Vinod (1970), Tyworth and O’Neill
(1997) or Ray et al. (2005).
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First examine the special case where per unit inventory costs are wijt = 1/qijt.
Then the inventory costs are not a function of qijt and are fully captured by the fixed
costs of importing Fjt. However, across countries j, the fixed costs of importing vary
due to uncertainty in the delivery time and ordering costs. In a standard trade model
based on firm level selection into export markets such as Melitz (2003), this suggests
that inventory costs impact the extensive margin of trade.
Now examine the impact of an increase in ordering costs and supply chain
uncertainty if the per unit inventory holding costs are constant. Note that an increase
in the ordering costs rjt increases the inventory costs for any given qijt. However, the
ordering cost is fixed per shipment, but the impact of an increase in the ordering
costs on the total inventory costs depends on qijt. To obtain intuition for this result
note that firms that ship a larger quantity spread this quantity over more shipments.
As a result, the same increase in the ordering costs impacts a firm that imports a
large quantity more than a firm that imports a small quantity. For this reason, a firm
with a larger qijt lowers the number of shipments faster in response to an increase
in rjt, raising the average inventory holding costs by more compared to a firm with
a smaller qijt. Therefore, an increase in ordering costs has a larger impact on costs
for firms that ship a larger quantity. It is straightforward to see that an increase in
supply chain uncertainty raises inventory costs due to an increase in the safety stock.








σijt ≈ w k365σijt. In
other words, for large quantities the total inventory cost is linear in qijt and we can















In this case the importer’s fixed cost, Fjt, depends on ordering and per unit inventory
holding costs, but the marginal inventory cost is a function of supply chain uncertainty
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as well as ordering costs. Assuming that the importer takes any varieties’ factory
gate price, pijt, and per-unit freight rate, fijt, as given, the constant marginal cost of
importing then equals








All else equal, supply chain uncertainty and ordering costs impact the constant
marginal cost of importing and storing a variety. Therefore, ordering and per unit
inventory costs impact the intensive margin of trade. Substitute mijt into the firms
import demand (2.1) to obtain
qijt =
(



















Supply chain uncertainty and ordering costs impact the intensive margin of trade.
To derive this import demand we make an additional simplifying assumption. We
assume that firms do not take into account the small chance that they run out of safety
stock when they derive the import demand. In other words, we are violating some
form of Jensen’s inequality. This assumption is based on the fact from the logisitics
literature that firms hold safety stock to satisfy 95-99% of their demand. Therefore,
firms act as if they are not really planing to run out of inventory. In theory, we can
always increase k to lower the probabiliy of running out, and Appendix A shows on a
simplified example that for relative import demands this probability does not matter
if one uses CES demand. This assumption emphasizes that we are concerned with the
average long run cost of inventory as opposed to the issue of short term adjustments
when firms run out of inventory as discussed by Alessandria et al. (2010).
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As shown in equation (2.4), delivery time uncertainty represents an additive
demand shifter. However, it can enter the import demand equation in a muktiplicative
way. Assume that ordering costs also depend on the per unit inventory holding costs,
so that the IC function from equation (2.2) becomes:















rates away the marginal costs are










If the per unit inventory holding costs are proportional to the unit price: w = apijt,
























and uncertainty is a multiplicative demand shifter.
The following two predictions summarize the main theoretical result describing
the impact of supply chain uncertainty and ordering costs on import demand.
Prediction 1. All else equal, an increase in the supply chain uncertainty for country
j decreases a firm’s imports from country j relative to its imports from all other
countries.
The intuition is that an increase in the supply chain uncertainty leads firms to
increase their safety stock to hedge against bad arrival shocks. Therefore, an increase
in the supply chain uncertainty of country j raises inventory holding costs for imports
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from country j relative to other source countries and lowers the firms’ import demand
relative to all other source countries.
The ordering costs impact the intensive margin of trade as follows.
Prediction 2. All else equal, an increase in the ordering costs for country j decreases
a firm’s imports from country j relative to its imports from all other countries.
The intuition follows the discussion above. Firms that ship a large total quantity
split this quantity over a larger number of shipments to economize on average
inventory holding costs. As a result, the same increase in ordering costs has a greater
impact on the inventory costs of firms that ship a large quantity. As a consequence,
for large quantities ordering costs are linear in the quantity and an increase in the
ordering costs raises the cost of importing.
2.3 Data, Estimation and Results
To test the predictions we need information on imports, uncertainty, ordering and
delivery costs, and prices. This section describes the specification, the data sources
and how the variables were constructed. We finish with presenting results as well as
robustness checks.
2.3.1 Specification
We employ a highly disaggregated panel dataset of U.S. imports for three years with
four dimensions of variation: across districts of entry d, across commodities h, across
source countries j and across time t. We do not observe data at the firm level. For
all regressions we assume that every district-commodity combination represents one
firm. In other words, the firm indicator i in the theory gets replaced with a h − d
couple in the empirical section.
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Note that the main equation of interest (2.4) is nonlinear in the variables of
interest. This poses a challenge for the estimation. While non-linear estimators
are available, the difficulty is that identification requires that we absorb several
unobserved variables with fixed effects. Given the large number of products and
countries this is difficult with a non-linear estimator and we work with two linear
approximations instead. First approximate the sum of trade costs in (2.4) by
1
ρ− 1








≈ β0 + β1ln(phdjt) + β2ln(fjt) + β3ln(rjt) + β4ln(σdjt).
Then we obtain the empirical model











+ uhdjt = vhdjt + uhdjt
captures approximation error, unobserved variables such as productivity differences
and aggregate demand. The rich variation in our panel data set allows us to
accommodate several assumptions about the disturbance εhdjt. If εhdjt is not correlated
with the trade costs, then an OLS estimator provides consistent estimates for βo, ..., β4.
If firms and demands are symmetric across districts but vary across commodities, then
vhdjt = δh , a commodity fixed effect. If demands vary systematically across districts
due to differences in productivity or market size, then vhdjt = δhd. If aggregate
demands vary by districts, commodities and time then vhdjt = δhdt. This specification
of the disturbance accounts for variation in import demands driven by the financial
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crisis over the sample period. Even though we do not model quality differences
explicitly, differences in quality of a product h across source countries may change
the relative import demands. To account for this unobserved variation we specify
εhdjt = δhdj + uhdjt where δhdj is a product-by-district-by-exporter fixed effect. In
summary, the rich variation of the data allows us to account for several sources
of unobserved variation that may impact the identification of the parameters with a
dummy variable estimator that pools the data over all dimensions. Specification (2.5)
has several advantages. The coefficients are easy to interpret in terms of elasticities
and fixed effects are easy to accommodate in the log-linear model. A further advantage
is that it solves an identification problem related to the fact that we only observe
import weights instead of quantities. Let qhdjt be the imports measured in weights
and suppose that a constant conversion factor λh translates weights to quantities
8.
Then, we can convert variables measured in kg to quantities by multiplying by λh.
However, given the log separability of the model we obtain
ln(qhdjt) = β0 + β1ln(phdjt) + β2ln(fjt) + β3ln(rjt) + β4ln(σhdjt) + γln(λh) + εhdjt
where γ = 1 − β1 − β2. Therefore, the product level fixed effect accounts for this
conversion problem in the log-linear model. The main disadvantage of the log-linear
model is that the coefficient estimates do not have a structural interpretation. To
obtain a “back-of-the-envelope” structural model, we can log-linearize ln(qhdjt) around








ln(qhdjt) = β0 + β1ln(phdjt) + β2ln(fjt) + β3ln(rjt) + β4ln(σhdjt) + εhdjt (2.6)
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σ̄.9 The constant, β0,
absorbs all constant terms around which the linearization is centered. Combining the
coefficient estimate β4 with the coefficient estimate β2 we can back out wk/365 and





For most of our variables we rely on U.S. Imports of Merchandise dataset. These
data report imports into the U.S. at monthly frequencies disaggregated by district
of entry, HS10 product, mode of transportation (air or ocean) and country of origin.
Constrained by the data sources we discuss below, we use the data for 2007-2009.
We have quantities (kg), the total value of the shipment (U.S.$) and the total freight
charges (U.S.$). Our theory applies to products that can be stored and managed
in inventories. Therefore we focus the identification on manufacturing imports and
exclude all other commodities from the sample. We also drop all shipments that come
from Canada and Mexico, because most of these shipments use ground transportation.
Let qohdjt be the total quantity of good h imported via ocean transport from country
j in year t arriving in district d. Price per kg is denoted as pohdjt and is calculated as
total value of the shipment divided by weight. Let f ohdjt denote the unit ocean freight
rate associated with the shipment computed as the total freight charge associated
with the shipment divided by the shipping weight, qohdjt. Similarly for air shipments





9For a detailed derivation of this linearization see Appendix B.
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Shipment level data
We now describe how we generate a proxy for supply chain uncertainty. The data
source we employ is a transaction level import database that includes vessel arrival
information purchased for the years 2007 to 2009 from Import Genius10. The main
dataset contains information on every import that arrives at a U.S. district by day
of entry. For each import we observe the vessel that delivered the product, the
country of origin, the last foreign port the vessel cleared and the expected arrival
date. All information is collected from the electronic bills of lading filed by the
shipper. Import Genius receives this information via a U.S. customs feed and
compiles the information. Similar to the imports of merchandise data we focus on
manufacturing goods. Eliminating non-manufacturing goods from the sample is more
difficult because the data does not report HS10 product codes. To solve this problem
we drop all products that include bulk shipments and liquid-carrying containers. This
reduces the number of observations by about 12%.11
We compute a district-by-country-by-year measure of supply chain uncertainty.12
This measure captures the idea that for a given exporter it may be more difficult to
be on time at different districts. Across the east and west coasts this may be due to
longer travel times and the necessity to cross the Panama Canal. At a given coast, it
may be more difficult to be on time at certain districts due to weather and possibly
congested ports.
Let Sdtj be the total number of vessels that arrive in district d in year t that unload
imports sourced from origin country j. Let sdtj identify a unique vessel arrival in Sdtj
10importgenius.com
11In the robustness section we experiment with a sample that includes only intermediate inputs.
12The data does not include HS10 codes. Therefore it is difficult to combine any product level
information from the Import Genius data with the imports of merchandise. Unfortunately we cannot
generate a product specific measure of supply chain uncertainty and merge it with the imports. With
our calculation of uncertainty we assume that firms in a certain district are faced with the same
variation in the delivery time from a certain country.
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and let AD(sdjt) and ED(sdjt) denote the actual and estimated arrival day of the
shipment. Let ∆(sdjt) = AD(sdjt) − ED(sdjt) denote the number of days the actual
arrival deviates from the expected arrival date. Figure 2.2 plots the distribution of
∆(sdjt) over all shipments.
We define supply chain uncertainty as the standard deviation of the difference




In the strictest sense this variable measures how punctual vessel arrivals are. On the
other hand, if export countries that have difficulty keeping a timely shipping schedule
are likely subject to other sources of supply chain uncertainty that we do not observe,
then our measure of uncertainty is a proxy for overall supply chain uncertainty.
See histogram 2.3 and Table 2.1 for the statistics of the uncertainty variable.
Initially we have 1096770 observations for uncertainty, 3% of them are zeros, so we lose
them when making a log transformation. We lose an additional 10% of observations
because of merges with other variables.
Uncertainty seems to be lower for higher-income countries, it is very high for
Central America and Africa, and the share of shipments that are early is higher
whenever the share of late shipments is low. Distance seems to be positively correlated
with uncertainty. Also, uncertainty is higher for 2008 and 2009 compared to 2007.




The theory asks that we control for ordering costs rjt to identify the impact of
supply chain uncertainty on trade. We obtain proxies for ordering costs from the
Doing Business database. They include the costs for documents, administrative fees
for customs clearance and technical control, customs broker fees, terminal handling
charges and inland transport. This is more than just per shipment fixed costs of
ordering as our theory requires, however the variable ordering costs such as inland
transport charges are impossible to separate. In addition we collect GDP, and
GDP per capita from the World Development Indicators to account for a source
countries’ level of development. Both variables are in 2000 constant U.S. dollars,
foreign currencies converted using the official exchange rate. See Table 2.3 for the
summary statistics of all variables used.
2.3.3 Results
Table 2.4 reports the coefficient estimates for specification (2.5) with standard errors
clustered by commodity-country-year. Column 1 reports benchmark OLS estimates.
Across columns 2 to 6 we include alternative fixed effects to account for unobserved
variation that impact the identification. Across all columns, the coefficient estimates
on the supply chain uncertainty are consistent with Prediction 1, an increase in
the supply chain uncertainty lowers imports. Column 2 introduces commodity fixed
effects, columns 3 and 4 introduce commodity-district fixed effects, column 5 presents
commodity-district country fixed effects, and column 6 finishes with commodity-
district year fixed effects. Consistent with our assumption that product-district
pairs identify firms, this means that the coefficients are identified within firms by
the variation in uncertainty across importer’s sources of products. In other words,
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the coefficient estimates suggest that all else equal, a given firm imports relatively
less from locations that exhibit a greater degree of supply chain uncertainty.
After accounting for commodity fixed effects, the coefficient estimates are
relatively stable across the specifications. The one outlier is the estimate of Model 5
that introduces commodity-by-district-by-exporter fixed effects. This specification is
robust with respect to unobserved variation in quality of imports by product across
export locations, and it is comforting that even at this level of rigor the estimates
are still consistent with Prediction 1. However, the particular fixed effect regiment
of this specification eliminates the main source of identifying variation; the fixed
effects absorb the cross-exporter-cross-district variation and rely only on variation
across time within countries to identify the coefficients. If supply chain uncertainty
is driven for example by port infrastructure, then we would not expect to see a large
amount of useful variation that helps identify the impact of uncertainty on imports
over time. Therefore, while this specification is robust to several sources of unobserved
information, we prefer the specifications that exploit the main source of identifying
variation such as the specification presented in Model 6.
Next we turn to Prediction 2. Across all but one model, an increase in order costs
lowers imports. This results is surprising, as we identify an impact of a variable on
the intensive margin of trade that usually is thought of as a fixed cost and therefore
mainly operates on the extensive margin of trade. A caveat is necessary. It is difficult
to find information that separates fixed ordering from variable trade costs. While
several costs reported in the World Bank’s doing business data reflect costs that an
importer incurs by order, some reflect more of a variable cost. This means that our
estimates are not precise about separating fixed ordering costs from variable costs.
However, most of the costs are fixed per order in nature and according to the theory
they should be included in the specification. This suggests that specifications that
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identify import demand omit an important source of trade costs if they do not include
fixed ordering costs and the fact that importers hold inventory.
An increase in per unit transport costs and factory gate prices lowers the import
demand. This is what we would expect from the theory, but several identification
issues need to be addressed. First, as of now we are not really interested in the
coefficients on these variables but are mainly concerned with absorbing the variation
to identify the impact of supply chain uncertainty and ordering costs on international
trade. However, if firms are small and supply curves are flat such as with constant
marginal costs, then importers take the factory gate prices as given and the impact
of a price change on imports is identified. Similarly, if individual importers are small
such that they do not impact the per unit shipping charges set by shippers that
serves many firms within a given period, then also the impact of an increase in the
per unit freight charge on import demand is identified. Hummels and Schaur (2012)
discuss this identification assumption and perform robustness checks using prices and
freight rates from lagged periods. They do not find evidence that freight rates are
endogenous even at the higher level of aggregation of HS6 commodities.
Columns 4-6 augment the specification with export country GDP and GDP per
capita to control for country characteristics. Most traditional models of trade include
these parameters. Both variables have a significant impact on imports as we would
expect from a long list of gravity estimation. However, including this information in
our model does not change our conclusions about supply chain uncertainty or ordering
costs.
All of the specifications in Table 2.4 include some sort of year effect. Accounting for
systematic differences across years is important due to the potential trade effects of the
financial crisis. While models 1 to 5 allow for systematic changes in the overall average
import demand, specification allows for time effects that are specific to commodities
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and districts. Therefore, model 6 is robust with respect to shocks driven by the
financial crisis that vary across industries and districts.
2.3.4 Robustness Checks
Alternative Measures of Supply Chain Uncertainty
First we use alternative measures of uncertainty and report estimation results in Table
2.5. We re-estimate Model 6 of the previous tables, but examine different ways of
computing supply chain uncertainty. The estimated date of arrival is supposed to be
the same for all shipments on a vessel, and it is for about 70% of observations. Other
vessels happen to have different estimated dates of arrival for different shipments
due to data entering error or other reasons. To solve this problem we take the most
common estimated date for the vessel (mode), obtaining an alternative measure of
the difference between the actual and estimated dates of arrival. The uncertainty
obtained this way is denoted σmodedjt and its impact on trade is still negative.
Another indicator of uncertainty in the supply chain is the share of shipments that
are late or early, share notdjt. It can be interpreted as a probability of a shipment
from a certain country to be not on time. To obtain that variable we calculate the
share of vessel trips for district d from country j in year t that were late or early out
of the total number of vessel trips for that district-country pair. As expected, the
results of Model 6.2 show that an increase in the probability of late arrival lowers the
import demand.
The third measure of uncertainty comes from the Logistics Performance Index
developed by the World Bank. Specifically we employ the timeliness component. This
timeliness parameter is very similar to what we estimate as delivery time uncertainty:
“timeliness of shipments in reaching destination within the scheduled or expected
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delivery time”. It is an index that ranges from 1.38 for Somalia to 4.48 for Germany.
Since this measure is increasing with better timeliness, the expected sign on the LPI
variable is positive. Column 3 shows that an increase in timeliness raises imports.
Alternative Theories
We now explore mechanisms that firms employ to smooth uncertainty other than
inventory management. The literature provides two competing theories. Evans and
Harrigan (2005) show evidence that firms move closer to the destination market to
ensure timely delivery if there are demand shocks. Hummels and Schaur (2010)
provide evidence that firms substitute into fast transport to hedge against demand
shocks. We add another possible explanation To identify the possibility of switching
between ocean and air transport we introduce the variable rate-mileahdt. This variable
captures the average unit freight rate for air shipping per mile traveled for a particular
commodity h. Distance is measured as a straight line from the capital of country j










This variable is an indicator of how expensive it is to ship via air as opposed to
shipping by ocean. Next denote the share of trade value that comes from Mexico and
Canada as mcshareit for each commodity i.
Table 2.6 provides evidence for the mechanisms introduced by Evans and Harrigan
and Hummels and Schaur based on the specification including commodity-district-
year fixed effects. To test Hummels and Schaur (2010) we include an interaction
term between uncertainty and air unit charges per mile. Products with higher air
unit charges make it more difficult to substitute for faster transport, therefore the
expected result is that uncertainty in ocean shipping would matter more for those
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products. The coefficient on the interaction term is negative, which makes the overall
effect of uncertainty larger in absolute value.
To examine the mechanism proposed by Evans and Harrigan we interact the
trade share that comes from Canada and Mexico with the supply chain uncertainty.
A higher share means that importers source a large amount of a commodity from
close-by countries allowing for a fast response time in case an importer runs out
of inventory instead of waiting for ocean shipments to arrive from far away. The
expected result is that for goods with a high share of trade coming from Canada and
Mexico uncertainty in the ocean transit time matters less. The coefficient on the
interaction term between the uncertainty and import share from Mexico and Canada
is positive. Therefore, supply chain uncertainty has less of an impact for commodities
that are heavily sourced from close by locations.
In conclusion, while we still find that supply chain uncertainty has a negative
impact on imports as predicted by the theory, this impact is heterogeneous in an
importer’s ability to source from close by locations or air ship.
Uncertainty and per capita income
Imports from rich countries are more attractive than imports from poor countries.
Holding everything else constant, we expect that higher uncertainty will hurt imports
from poor countries more than imports from rich countries. In this section we show
that uncertainty matters more for products ordered from countries with smaller per
capita income. An interaction term between the delivery time uncertainty and a
country of origin’s GDP per capita has a positive coefficient as shown in column 3 of
Table 2.6, which means that lower income leads to a higher impact of uncertainty on
imports.
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Uncertainty impact by product category
Our estimates of the uncertainty impact are averaged across all commodities. That
average hides a lot of variation in how imports of different commodity groups respond
to changes in the delivery time uncertainty. One important classification is the
differentiated versus homogeneous products. It should be less harmful for an importer
of a product to be faced with high delivery shocks if the product is easily substitutable.
The first two rows of Table 2.7 show that this idea is supported by our data based on
the preferred specification with commodity-country-year fixed effects. Using Rauch
(1999) classification we find that uncertainty impact is higher than average for the
differentiated goods and lower than average for homogeneous goods.
We also employ the U.S. Census end use classification to study the different
impact of uncertainty based on the products’ end use characteristics. Imports of
goods that are more difficult to store in inventory, such as foods and beverages,
respond to uncertainty in a less significant way. Industry supplies, capital goods and
machinery are associated with a smaller uncertainty impact than consumer products
and automotive vehicles. This could be explained by better organized supply chains
for the goods needed in manufacturing, since those goods are especially time sensitive.
It could also be that firms that import inputs hold inventory in final output as opposed
to inputs and the import cost due to inventory is average over all sources of inputs.
Furthermore, Hummels and Schaur (2012) provide evidence that inputs are among
the most time sensitive commodities in trade. As a result, firms that require timely
delivery may have other sourcing strategies such as purchasing inputs from close
by locations or flying them in by more expensive air transport. We examine these
alternative channels in section 2.3.4. Final products might also be ordered by a larger
number of importers, which means uncertainty will impact more entities and have
a greater cumulative effect. For example, imports of footwear go down by 9.8% in
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response to a 10% increase in uncertainty, which is a much bigger than average impact.
Uncertainty in the delivery of chemicals that are part of the industrial supplies and
materials group is associated with a much smaller decrease in trade of about 3%.
Ordering costs have a higher impact on the homogeneous goods, however when
split by the end use category, ordering costs impact follows the pattern similar to
uncertainty. Imports of consumer goods respond more to the changes in the per
order cost than imports of intermediate products represented by industry supplies or
capital goods. Import demand for differentiated goods such as footwear goes down
by 20% if the costs to order increase by 10%, whereas the demand for homogeneous
products like chemicals only goes down by 5%.
2.3.5 Structural Estimation
Finally we estimate the “structural model” equation (2.6).This specification coincides
with the reduced form, so we use the results presented in Table 2.413. We pick the
coefficients from the last two models because model 6 is our preferred specification
and model 5 gives the smallest estimate of the uncertainty impact. The coefficient













For k = 2.33, per kilogram inventory holding costs are equal to w1 = $20.11/kg or
w2 = $261.75/kg. Then, for a one standard deviation increase in uncertainty (sd(σ)
13Structural specification does not include variables GDP and GDP per capita. We estimated
model 6 without those variables, and the final calculations of inventory costs did not change in a
significant way
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q̄ijt = 0.83 · 17.55 ·
2.33
365




q̄ijt = 0.83 · 307.39 ·
2.33
365
· 452606 = 627694.24
In other words, the cost of additional safety stock due to a one standard deviation
increase in σ, holding the total inventory quantity fixed, is about 627,694 dollars per
year, if we use our preferred specification estimate. This means that if a firm orders
the same quantity from two different countries, it has to spend 627,694 dollars more
per year to store products obtained from the country with a one standard deviation
higher uncertainty. Inventory holding costs represent the annual cost of adding one
more unit to the safety stock. Our estimate shows that these marginal costs are rather
large: 262 dollars per kg per year. Freight charges are equal to only 1.1 dollars/kg
for ocean shipping or 6.1 dollars/kg for air shipping. Inventory costs are also high
compared to unit values, U.S.$ 36 on average. However, it is important to note that
this is the cost if the unit is stored for an entire year. At daily withdrawal rates, the
cost of inventory per day is 261.75/365 ≈ 0.72U.S.$.
2.4 Conclusions
This paper investigates the impact of supply chain uncertainty and ordering costs
on trade flows. Previous studies have been preoccupied with the effects of demand
uncertainty on trade. An increase in supply chain uncertainty raises safety stocks,
increases inventory holding costs, and reduces imports from locations with high
delivery uncertainty. High ordering costs reduce shipping frequency, increase average
inventory holding cost for a firm’s base inventory stock, and result in fewer imports
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from locations where ordering costs are high. Supply chain uncertainty is measured
using detailed data on actual and expected arrival times of vessels at U.S. ports.
Results indicate delivery time delay significantly reduces trade volumes. A 10 percent
increase in supply chain uncertainty reduces imports by as much as 4.2 percent. When
ordering costs rise one percent, imports fall by up to 1.2 percent.
Late shipments may be due to factors beyond shipping lines’ control. Included
here are bad weather, labor strikes, fires, ship collusions, groundings, and delays at
previous ports of call. A large nation, like the U.S., imports most shipments over
direct trade routes. Trade costs associated with supply chain uncertainty are more
important for lower income countries with inadequate port facilities that ship through
multiple ports of call. A container ship that misses its contractually negotiated
birthing window affects both berth and yard planning at seaport terminals, leading
to port congestion. High trade costs associated with supply chain uncertainty suggest
much can be gained from reducing port congestion. Countries can reduce congestion
at ports by investing in additional container handling capacity and by improving
infrastructure. Reductions in supply chain uncertainty can stimulate trade and lead








Figure 2.1: Inventory Process Illustrated
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Figure 2.2: Difference between the actual date of arrival and the estimated date of
arrival
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Figure 2.3: Uncertainty for district d and country j
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Table 2.1: Table of summary statistics of uncertainty
∆vdjt Late shipments only Early shipments only
N avg med sd share avg med sd share avg med sd
all observations 566453 0.58 0 1.96 0.34 2.3 1.53 2.09 0.13 1.6 1 1.98
years
2007 236781 0.7 0 1.96 0.38 2.35 2 2 0.12 1.55 1 1.85
2008 171290 0.56 0 2.06 0.33 2.4 1.64 2.24 0.14 1.71 1 2.13
2009 158382 0.41 0 1.82 0.3 2.1 1.02 2.05 0.14 1.53 1 1.97
regions
n america 10937 0.45 0 1.5 0.27 2.07 1 1.75 0.075 1.6 1 1.82
c america 78462 0.53 0 1.8 0.31 2.28 1.09 2 0.11 1.64 1 1.78
s america 47273 0.85 0 2.22 0.39 2.69 2 2.27 0.12 1.68 1 1.84
europe 156878 0.71 0 2.05 0.37 2.49 2 2.1 0.14 1.56 1 1.85
asia 247074 0.45 0 1.88 0.32 2.06 1 2.04 0.14 1.59 1 2.13
australia 10998 0.55 0 1.87 0.35 2.25 1.88 1.86 0.16 1.45 1 1.86
africa 12985 1 0 2.29 0.44 2.82 2 2.25 0.1 1.76 1 1.76
puerto rico 1846 0.29 0 1.08 0.26 1.52 1 1.19 0.075 1.32 1 1.43
coasts
east coast 385502 0.66 0 1.96 0.35 2.4 1.98 2.11 0.12 1.56 1 1.84
west coast 156240 0.38 0 1.92 0.32 2.04 1 2.02 0.17 1.6 1 2.15
income
low income 6278 0.71 0 1.85 0.37 2.34 2 1.95 0.097 1.6 1 1.67
lower-middle income 193622 0.63 0 2.02 0.35 2.38 1.67 2.19 0.12 1.64 1 2.04
upper-middle income 73977 0.53 0 1.86 0.33 2.24 1.14 1.98 0.13 1.6 1 1.85
higher income non-oecd 65420 0.44 0 1.84 0.31 2.1 1 2.01 0.13 1.62 1 2.14
higher income oecd 207325 0.61 0 1.98 0.35 2.35 1.91 2.06 0.14 1.57 1 1.9
53
Table 2.2: Descriptive regressions
LHS log of log of
variable uncertainty share not on time
log of distance 0.158 0.094
(0.035)*** (0.029)***
log of GDP 0.006 -0.006
(0.011) (0.008)
2008 dummy 0.212 0.120
(0.027)*** (0.028)***






Note: The unit of observation is at the country-year level. Estimator:
OLS with robust standard errors that are clustered by country.
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Table 2.3: Summary statistics
Variable Source Mean Std. Dev. N
σdjt uncertainty by district Import Genius 1.92 0.828 946087
σmodedjt uncertainty by district, mode Import Genius 1.928 0.832 946087
share notdjt share not on time Import Genius 0.47 0.23 933113
lpi logistics performance index World Bank 3.991 0.346 944219
qoijdt ocean weight (tons) US Census 452.606 9106.514 946087
pohdjt value per kg US Census 35.487 1069.581 946087
faijdt air unit freight rates US Census 6.08 29.503 293405
f oijdt ocean unit freight rates US Census 1.154 32.567 946087
rate-mileait air freight rates per mile traveled US Census 0.001 0.004 293390
shareMCit Mexico and Canade trade share US Census 0.176 0.213 946080
rjt ordering costs Doing Business 768.189 290.79 946087
GDPjt GDP (bln $ US) World Development Indicators 1347.469 1341.533 946087
GDPCjt GDP per capita ($ US) World Development Indicators 13733.095 13065.34 946087
55
Table 2.4: The effect of uncertainty on log of ocean-shipped weight
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(in logs)
uncertainty -0.114 -0.262 -0.405 -0.390 -0.025 -0.417
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)***
price -1.045 -1.096 -1.104 -1.047 -0.869 -1.067
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.004)***
ordering cost -0.728 -1.014 -1.170 -0.705 -0.064 -0.735
(0.011)*** (0.010)*** (0.012)*** (0.010)*** (0.029) (0.012)***
freight rate -0.207 -0.131 -0.131 -0.143 -0.117 -0.150
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)***
year8 0.100 0.102 0.107 0.042 -0.042
(0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.007)*** (0.005)***
year9 -0.024 -0.005 -0.003 -0.126 -0.296
(0.010)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.007)***
GDP 0.374 -0.005 0.391
(0.003)*** (0.273) (0.003)***
GDPC -0.247 0.984 -0.253
(0.003)*** (0.276)*** (0.003)***
Constant 15.950 18.098 19.220 8.074 2.899 7.891
(0.073)*** (0.065)*** (0.079)*** (0.092)*** (5.021) (0.105)***
Commodity FE no yes no no no no
Comm-district FE no no yes yes no no
Comm-dist-country FE no no no no yes no
Comm-dist-year FE no no no no no yes
R-squared 0.314 0.439 0.489 0.520 0.858 0.466
N 946087 946087 946087 946087 946087 946087
Note: The dependent variable in all specifications is the log of imports in kgs. The unit of observation is at the
commodity-district-country-year level. The standard errors are robust and clustered by commodity-country-year.
Estimator: Pooled OLS
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Table 2.5: Alternative measures of uncertainty








price -1.069 -1.070 -1.074
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)***
ordering cost -0.728 -0.739 -0.728
(0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)***
freight rate -0.149 -0.149 -0.148
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)***
GDP 0.395 0.394 0.392
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)***
GDPC -0.256 -0.249 -0.264
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)***
Constant 7.790 7.535 7.126
(0.107)*** (0.107)*** (0.121)***
R-squared 0.464 0.462 0.462
N 931409 931409 931409
Note: The dependent variable in all specifications is the log of imports
in kgs. The unit of observation is at the commodity-district-country-
year level. The standard errors are robust and clustered by commodity-
country-year. Estimator: Pooled OLS with commodity-district-year
fixed effects
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Table 2.6: The impact of air shipment, import from Mexico and Canada and source
country’s income on the uncertainty elasticity of vessel imports
Variable (1) (2) (3)
(in logs)
uncertainty -0.935 -0.477 -1.297
(0.060)*** (0.013)*** (0.035)***
uncertainty · air rate per mile -0.079
(0.009)***
air rate per mile dropped





price -1.066 -1.066 -1.064
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)***
ordering cost -0.745 -0.744 -0.739
(0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)***
freight rate -0.151 -0.151 -0.151
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)***
GDP 0.394 0.394 0.398
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)***
GDPC -0.255 -0.255 -0.303
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)***
Constant 7.899 7.882 8.165
(0.106)*** (0.106)*** (0.105)***
R-squared 0.461 0.461 0.462
N 932405 932405 932405
Note: The dependent variable in all specifications is the log of imports in kgs. The unit of
observation is at the commodity-district-country-year level. The standard errors are robust
and clustered by commodity-country-year. Estimator: Pooled OLS with commodity-district-
year fixed effects
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Table 2.7: The effect of uncertainty on log of ocean-shipped weight by category
Product Uncertainty Ordering costs Obs N
category impact impact
Homogeneous goods -0.138 -0.263 152035
(0.027)*** (0.028)***
Differentiated goods -0.501 -0.884 655109
(0.012)*** (0.015)***
End use category (1 digit)
Foods and beverages -0.348 -0.097 1964
(0.210)* (0.241)
Industry supplies and materials -0.145 -0.290 289877
( 0.018)*** (0.020)***
Capital goods, except automotive -0.223 -0.522 231358
(0.019)*** (0.021)***
Automotive vehicles, parts and engines -0.465 -0.582 43230
( 0.043)*** (0.049)***
Consumer goods -0.655 -1.302 360741
(0.015 )*** (0.020)***
Nondurable goods -0.831 -1.375 206384
( 0.020)*** (0.026)***
Durable goods -0.304 -1.315 152290
(0.023)*** (0.031)***
Other goods -0.171 -0.105 10372
(0.054)*** (0.061)*
End use category examples (5 digit)
Chemicals (12540) -0.331 -0.446 23527
(0.080)*** (0.071)***
Footwear (40040) -0.985 -2.054 13517
( 0.107)*** (0.117)***
Note: The dependent variable in all specifications is the log of imports in kgs. The unit of observation is
at the commodity-district-country-year level. The standard errors are robust and clustered by commodity-
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Murphy, K. J. and Zábojńık, J. (2004). New developments in human-capital theory
- CEO pay and appointments: A market-based explanation for recent trends.
American Economic Review, 94(2):192–196. 1
64
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A Jensen’s inequality and relative demands
We show that ignoring probabilities of a stock-out does not make a difference for the
relative import demands prediction.
Assume the CES production function for output Q and two inputs q1 and q2




α . For a simplified example let π be
the probability that all of qi arrives, (1 − π) is the probability that only half of the
ordered quantity arrives. Import costs have the general form of miqi. There are four
possibilities: both shipments arrive in full, one gets in reduced by half or both arrive
reduced. Then the objective function becomes:
min
q1,q2
m1q1 +m2q2 − λ(π2(qα1 + qα2 )
1



































































































Dividing (8) by (9) clearly shows that probabilities cancel out and the import
demand from country 1 relative to import demand from country 2 depends only on































Rewrite the main equation (2.4) such that every endogenous variable x is replaced















Using first-order Taylor approximation of equation (10) for all endogenous
variables around (ln(q̄), ln(p̄), ln(f̄), ln(r̄), ln(σ̄)), we obtain:
LHS = ln(q̄) +
1
q̄










































































































































Change the subscript from i to hd to match the level of aggregation in our data
and obtain:
ln(qhdjt) = β0 + β1ln(phdjt) + β2ln(fjt) + β3ln(rjt) + β4ln(σhdjt) + εhdjt,
which is our structural estimation of the model, equation (2.6).
70
C Units vs. kilograms
Assume a switching parameter γ that transforms units into kilograms, with γ being
constant within one 10-digit industry code: qijt = γq
′
ijt, where qijt is quantity in
units and q′ijt is quantity in kgs. Similarly the purchasing price per unit and freight









































































































Combining all the constant terms into the intercept and renaming coefficients, the
structural estimation becomes:






ln(γf ′jt) + β3ln(rjt) + β4ln(σhdjt) + εhdjt
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which we estimate to be equal to 1.67. From here we find that the per kg inventory
holding costs wγ are equal to $262.
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